© 2019-2020 CTB.
All rights reserved.

Publications

Category: Game Theory

Feelings and flirtations foster long-term cooperation

Carl T. Bergstrom and Graeme Ruxton

Game Theory

Honest signaling made simple

Jacob Chisausky, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

Communication, Game Theory, Evolution

The cost of information acquisition by natural selection

Ryan S. McGee, Olivia Kosterlitz, et al.

Evolution, Information theory, Game Theory

Signals without teleology

Carl T. Bergstrom, Simon Huttegger, and et al.

Communication, Game theory, Philosophy

Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality

Carl T. Bergstrom, Jacob G. Foster, and Yangbo Song

Science of Science, Economics Game Theory, Philosophy

Contest models highlight inherent inefficiencies of scientific funding competitions

Kevin Gross and Carl T. Bergstrom

Science of Science, Economics, Game Theory

Microbiology: Taking the bad with the good

Carl T. Bergstrom and Benjamin Kerr

Evolutionary Medicine, Game Theory

Honest signaling with costly gambles

Frazer Meacham, Aaron Perlmutter, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Choosing Partners: A Classroom Experiment

Carl T. Bergstrom, Theodore C. Bergstrom, et al.

Economics, Game Theory

Building Trust by Wasting Time

Carl T. Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Michael Lachmann

Game Theory, Economics

The disadvantage of combinatatorial communication

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Evolution, Game Theory

Evolutionary Rates and the Division of Surpluses in Mutualisms

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Evolution, Game Theory

Separating equilibria in continuous signaling games

Carl T. Bergstrom, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

Michael Lachmann, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Alarm calls as costly signals of antipredator vigilance: the watchful babbler game

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Toward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching

Carl T. Bergstrom and Leslie Real

Evolution, Game Theory, Economics

Pure versus mixed strategists: the evolution of behavioral heterogeneity in individuals and populations

Carl T. Bergstrom and Peter Godfrey-Smith

Evolution, Game theory, Philosophy

Signalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly?

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Evolution, Communication, Game theory